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COMMENT
TERRY REVISITED AND THE LAW OF STOP-AND-FRISK
IN TEXAS
by Marc H. Folladori
In Terry v. Ohio' the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of
law enforcement officials to stop and frisk. The case marked the first time
that the Supreme Court directly sanctioned a government intrusion upon the
private citizen with justification which amounted to less than probable cause
to arrest or search.2 Because of this, commentators have noted the potential for
misapplication of the ruling, some stating that Terry expanded governmental
authority to search.' Indeed, since 1968 the decision has been widely employed
to uphold convictions in cases with fact situations ranging from airport hijacking searches4 to searches of automobiles incident to arrests for minor traffic
violations.5 On the other hand, any discussion of Texas developments in the
law of stop-and-frisk prior to 1972 will prove to be brief. Under Terry, the
authority to stop and frisk is clearly present, but there have been few decisions
by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas dealing with the procedure. However, recent opinions by the court do indicate an increased awareness of the
Terry holding.
This Comment will attempt to focus upon three fundamental areas: the
impact of Terry on governmental authority to conduct searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment; the development of stop-and-frisk doctrine in
the context of Texas jurisprudence; and the effect certain recently decided cases
may have upon Terry's holding and the law of stop-and-frisk in Texas.'
I. IN THE BEGINNING: TERRY AND SIBRON

The 1960's were marked by a tremendous expansion of case law defining the
limits of governmental searches and seizures under the fourth amendment of
1392 U.S. 1 (1968). Companion cases to Terry decided the same day were Sibron v.
New York and Peters v. New York. The opinions in Sibron and Peters were consolidated

for discussion of New York's stop-and-frisk statute. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See notes 34-35
infra, and accompanying text.
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . " U. S. CONST. amend. IV. See also TEx. CONST. art. I, § 9. The
Supreme Court of the United States has stated that "[pjrobable cause exists if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has
been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
The fourth amendment requirement that probable cause exist in order for a search or
arrest warrant to be issued extends to warrantless arrests and searches as well. See Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948).
'Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 ALA. L. REv. 287, 300
(1971); Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The
Problem of Stop-and-Frisk, 45 CONN. B.J. 146, 184 (1971).

" United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Riggs, 347
F. Supp. 1098 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
5 Corbitt v. State, 445 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
'See, e.g., Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Baker v. State,
478 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See generally note 112 infra, and accompanying
text.
'Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Talbert v. State, 489 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.
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the Constitution.8 Despite this expansion, commentators often noted the paucity
of constitutional guidelines authorizing a police officer to stop, question, and
frisk a private citizen where inadequate grounds for an arrest or search existed.' In 1968 the Supreme Court was directly confronted with this issue in
the now-famous classic stop-and-frisk factual situation in Terry v. Ohio." A
police officer's attention was attracted to the activities of two men directly
across the street from him in downtown Cleveland. One suspect would walk
in front of a store window, stop and peer inside, and then continue walking
ahead. At a certain point down the street he would turn around and walk
back to join his companion, stopping to stare into the same store again. His
companion would then follow the same procedure. The two suspects repeated
the ritual about a dozen times (apparently "casing" the store for a potential
robbery attempt). A third man then joined the pair, conferred with them,
and walked away. The two suspects waited momentarily before following the
third man. By this point, the officer was highly suspicious of these activities,
and he pursued and confronted the three men at a point two blocks down the
street from the subject store. He identified himself as a police officer and asked
for their identification. When they failed to give a coherent reply, the officer
spun defendant Terry around, patted him down, and felt a pistol which he
removed from his pocket. Terry was subsequently convicted for carrying a
concealed weapon.
In considering whether the officer's conduct was reasonable, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that no probable cause to arrest had existed, but felt that
the street confrontation situation required a balancing of society's needs to
detect and prevent crime with the constitutional protections forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures.11 The Court first determined that stop-andfrisk procedures are governed by fourth amendment standards, rejecting the
state's argument that they represent lesser intrusions upon the person than
full-blown searches and seizures. Applying a fourth amendment test of reasonCrim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See generally
notes 100-20 infra, and accompanying text.
8E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (eavesdropping upon the defendant's
conversation in a telephone booth is an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (searches by municipal
administrative agencies require a search warrant where an inspector is refused entry); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 364 (1967) (warrantless search for weapons and
items of evidentiary value is permissible where police are in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (a search of an automobile incident to an
arrest must be contemporaneous in time and at the same location as the arrest); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (all evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search
and seizure is inadmissible in state criminal proceedings); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960) (any person legally on the premises where a governmental search has occurred
has standing to question the validity of the search).
'See generally Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52
IOWA L. REv. 1093 (1967); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62
(1966); Kuh, In-Field Interrogation:Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3 CRIM. L. BULL.
597 (1967); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current
Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331; Oberman & Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against
"Stop and Frisk," 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 441 (1967); Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding
Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966); Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a
Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 532 (1967).
1392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11Id. at 21-22.
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ableness, the Court found that the officer's actions were reasonable in light of
the circumstances, and noted the law enforcement official's need for a variety
of appropriate responses for the many different situations which confront him
in the course of his law enforcement duties." The majority held that a policeman may reasonably detain and question a citizen for the purpose of investigating suspected criminal activity in appropriate circumstances, where probable
cause to arrest may be lacking. If, during the course of the investigation, the
police officer finds reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous,
and that his or others' safety may be jeopardized, the Court stated that the
policeman may conduct a pat-down of the outer clothing of the suspect to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
Thus, reasonableness, not probable cause, was thereafter to be the guideline
in determining the constitutionality of a policeman's conduct in stop-and-frisk
situations. To justify a particular governmental intrusion upon a person or his
property, the Court stated that the policeman "must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."14' The majority, no doubt searching
for something more tangible to guide police conduct in that less-thanprobable-cause grey area, formulated an "objective standard" against which
the facts surrounding the circumstances might be judged: "Would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate ....
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court
has consistently refused to sanction."1

The Court stated that a reviewing court must be guided by a bifurcated
reasonableness test in applying their holding in Terry: First of all, a court
must review the facts and ask whether the facts warranted the intrusion upon
the individual's fourth amendment rights. Secondly, a court must review
whether the scope of such an intrusion was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." For instance, the
scope of the frisk of the defendant Terry by the police officer was found to be
reasonable by the Court, pointing to the facts that the officer did not place
his hands beneath the outer garments of the defendant and his companions
until he felt a weapon. This procedure, according to the Court, was not a
"general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might
find," but rather a limited search confined "strictly to what was minimally
necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he
discovered the weapons."'" The net effect of the holding in Terry was the
granting to policemen the authority to make a seizure and conduct a limited
search in factual circumstances which would be inadequate to warrant the
issuance of a search or arrest warrant. This fact, along with the consequent
121d. at 10.
13Id. at 28-30.
14Id. at 21.
5Id. at 21-22.
1 Id.at 20.
1Id. at 30.
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fears of resultant unbridled police discretion in street confrontations, was
voiced in the dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas." Indeed, Terry did mark
an extreme departure from a long-standing premise of the Court that the
absence of a warrant would not of itself grant greater authority to the police
in conducting searches and seizures.
In the companion case of Sibron v. New York" the Court applied its holding
in Terry to a similar fact situation, and thereby demonstrated what it considered to be an unreasonable stop-and-frisk. A police officer walking his beat
had observed the defendant Sibron conversing with six or eight known narcotics addicts. The officer later observed Sibron in a restaurant talking with
three more known addicts. He approached Sibron in the restaurant, asked him
to step outside and said, "You know what I am after." Sibron mumbled something and put his hand into his pocket; the officer thrust his hand into Sibron's
pocket and pulled out containers of heroin. The Court held that the officer's
actions constituted an unreasonable, and thereby unlawful, search, and not a
frisk for weapons; therefore, probable cause was required to search the
suspect. The Court determined that the officer in Sibron was clearly seeking
narcotics rather than acting for his own safety.
II. THE LAW OF STOP-AND-FRISK IN TEXAS
In the five years following Terry many jurisdictions have developed a
sizable body of case law in the stop-and-frisk area,"0 while a number of states
have granted authority and created guidelines for policemen through legislation.2 ' In Texas, no such stop-and-frisk statute exists, and until 1973 only one
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas dealt specifically with the
reasonableness of an on-the-street detention of a suspect in circumstances
where less than probable cause existed to make an arrest." The broad statutory
"Id. at 35-39. See generally Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-15 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 161-62 (1925).
19392 U.S. 40 (1968).
20 E.g., The California Supreme Court, even prior to Terry, had authorized a "stop" of
a suspect under certain circumstances. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658,
30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963). See also People v. Collins, 1 Cal. 3d 658, 463 P.2d 403, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 179 (1970); People v. Cruppi, 265 Cal. App. 2d 9, 71 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968). Other
states also held the "stop" to be constitutional within defined limits. See Cannon v. State,
53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961); DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244
(1960); State v. Gulczynski, 32 Del. 120, 120 A. 88 (1922); Commonwealth v. Matthews,
355 Mass. 378, 244 N.E.2d 908 (1969); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196
N.E.2d 840 (1964); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1964); People v. Joslin, 32 App. Div. 2d 859, 301 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Clarke, 219 Pa. Super. 340, 280 A.2d 662 (1971); Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa.
338, 263 A.2d 342 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969);
Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 (1962)
(per curiam).
1E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-1.01 (1970); LA. CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 215.1
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW S 140.50 (McKinney Supp. 1972). These statutes
are essentially codifications of the holding in Terry. See also CAL. PEN. CODE S 833 (1970);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902 (Supp. 1970), 1903 (1953); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch, 41, § 98 (Supp. 1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 594:3 (1955); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 12-7-1 (1956).
"Baity v. State, 455 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 918 (1970);
see Hensley v. State, 494 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Even in those Texas cases
whose factual situations properly call for application of Terry's holding, the court has gen-
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authority granted a Texas peace officer to arrest without benefit of a warrant
may be a principal reason for the absence of Texas case authority dealing
with stop-and-frisk. If a lawful arrest without warrant is made, a search incidental and contemporaneous to that arrest for weapons and items of evidentiary
value may be conducted,"5 although the scope of the search must be reasonable
within fourth amendment standards." Article 14.01 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure sets out the general statutory authority for an arrest without
a warrant.' However, such authority is by no means limited to article 14.01;
for example, provisions in the Texas Penal Code concerning the unlawful
sale or possession of alcoholic beverages " and violations of the Motor Vehicle
Act' grant similar authority to peace officers.
More relevant in the context of stop-and-frisk is article 14.03 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which authorizes a peace officer to make a warrantless
arrest of any persons "found in suspicious places and under circumstances
which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or
breach of the peace, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against
the laws."" Many convictions in Texas have been based wholly or partially
on article 14.03 or its predecessors. 9 However, serious questions must be raised
concerning article 14.03's constitutional validity. First, the provision, read
literally, gives Texas peace officers authority to arrest in circumstances which
the Supreme Court in Terry had decreed would only be appropriate for an
investigative stop. In other words, article 14.03 seems to grant authority to
erally relied on other authority to justify the peace officer's conduct. For instance, in Sanchez
v. State, 438 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), a highway patrolman stopped an automobile driving away from a warehouse late at night. The suspects refused to answer any
questions. The patrolman searched their persons and discovered marijuana. The court held
that the search was valid as incident to an arrest authorized by TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 14.03 (Supp. 1972). See notes 28-29 infra, and accompanying text. See also Lara
v. State, 469 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972).
" Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
24 E.g., in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969),
the Court delineated the
boundaries of a search incident to the arrest of the defendant in his own home, deciding
that after the arrest it was reasonable for the officers to search only the person and immediate surrounding area of the arrestee for weapons and items of evidentiary value in order
to prevent harm to the officers and insure that evidence will not be destroyed. See also
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
,3TEx.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Supp. 1972) states that the peace officer
has authority to arrest without warrant for a felony, an offense against the public peace,
or for
any offense, committed in his presence or within his view.
2
6TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-4 (1952).
"Id. art. 803 (1964).
21TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.03
(Supp. 1972). See Comment, The Law
of Arrest in Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 303, 306 (1965).
A statute similar in scope to article 14.03 is TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.24
(Supp. 1972), which provides that a police officer, whenever he believes a crime has been
committed, may stop any person he reasonably believes was present at the commission and
demand identification. Failure or refusal to answer to the officer's satisfaction may be followed by confining the suspect in jail "until he so identifies himself." The city of Dallas
has a similarly worded ordinance. DALLAS, TEXAS, REV. CODE § 31-61 (1960).
29E.g., Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Broom v. State,
463 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971); Alaniz v.
State, 458 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Stuart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969); Carter v. State, 445 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Cox v.
State, 442 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Sanchez v. State, 438 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969); Laube v. State, 417 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Chambler
v. State, 416 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Roach v. State, 398 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1966).
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arrest on suspicion, thereby violating the requirement that probable cause
exist in order for an arrest to be constitutionally valid."0 Secondly, the statute
may be too vague and indefinite to withstand constitutional attack.
The Supreme Court has held that criminal legislation must provide ascertainable standards of guilt so that individuals will be given fair notice that
their conduct is considered criminal by law." For example, in 1972, the
Supreme Court held in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville" that a vagrancy
ordinance was void for vagueness under the fourteenth amendment. Because
the ordinance was so vague that the average citizen would be unable to determine when he was committing an offense, procedural due process was held
to be denied. The ordinance was also found to be too vague in that it permitted police to make arbitrary arrests based upon mere suspicion. Scrutiny of
article 14.03 in light of this decision indicates that it fails to meet these constitutional standards.' Because of its lack of protective guidelines to insure due
process, the provision seems to sanction unbridled police discretion to arrest.
Of course, the constitutionality of a statute on its face has been found not
to be the sole determinant of its constitutional validity. In Sibron v. New
York 4 both parties argued that the principal issue before the Court was the
constitutionality of New York's stop-and-frisk statute, a statute similar in scope
to Texas' article 14.03. The Court declined to rule on the validity of the
statute, noting that the conduct which a statute authorizes is more relevant
in a determination of its constitutionality than the language on its face. The
validity of a warrantless search, it was noted, is to be decided in the "concrete
factual context of the individual case" considered in relation to the fourth
amendment's reasonableness standard.' Therefore, an attack upon article
14.03's validity must be grounded upon allegedly unconstitutional police conduct squarely authorized by the statute. And, the fact that the arrest is often
further justified by statutory authority in addition to article 14.03 makes the
burden upon one directly attacking the provision heavier still.'
III.

APPLICATION AND MISAPPLICATION OF TERRY

Despite the majority's attempts in Terry to confine the scope of the issue
30405 U.S. 156 (1972). See also Baker v. State, 478 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972), in which the court of criminal appeals, following Papachristou, ruled that the city
of Lubbock's vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite.
31See note 2 supra.
"See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939).
"The constitutionality of article 14.03's predecessors was upheld before the court of
criminal appeals. See Purdy v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 154, 261 S.W.2d 850 (1953); Crippen
v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 293, 189 S.W. 496 (1916).
34392 U.S. 40 (1968).
' Id. at 59-62; see Colvin, Criminal Law and Procedure, 23 Sw. L.J. 223, 224-25 (1969).
"E.g., in Lara v. State, 469 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1040 (1972), both article 14.01 and article 14.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
were used to justify the suspect's arrest. See also Wallace v. State, 467 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971); Alaniz v. State, 458 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Cox v.
State, 442 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Article 14.03 is said to pertain to the
"environment" surrounding the arrest when it is implemented with other arrest authority.
Likewise, its usage by Texas law enforcement officers is said to be quite restricted due to
the possibilities that it carries for false arrest. Interview with W. Westmoreland, District
Attorney's office of Dallas County, Texas, in Dallas, Jan. 2, 1973.
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presented to the Court,"7 Justice Douglas in his dissent in Terry expressed fears
that the constitutional guarantees of the fourth amendment would be watered
down as a result of the opinion." While subsequent case law has not reflected

any major upheaval, Terry has had a noticeable impact in certain areas of
criminal jurisprudence in Texas and in other jurisdictions.
A. Detention and Investigation of the Suspect
A temporary detention of a suspect for further investigation prior to Terry
would have arguably constituted an arrest. 9 Terry, however, constitutionally
sanctioned a reasonable detention in circumstances where probable cause to
make an arrest did not exist, thereby allowing courts to be less stringent regarding review of the "stop" stage in police investigation procedures. One
author has noted that Terry's impact already has been felt in cases upholding
temporary detentions which would have before caused "considerable 'constitutional jitters.' "'

Two cases handed down by United States Courts of Appeals exemplify this
broadened authority. In United States v. Saldana4 ' two agents of the Border
Patrol were maintaining traffic surveillance at a terminal of an Oklahoma
turnpike to apprehend illegal aliens. ' They observed a camper-pickup truck
stopped at the toll gate with three occupants "of Mexican descent" in the front
seat, and asked the driver, Saldana, to pull over to a nearby parking area.
The agents then questioned the three and ascertained that Saldana's passengers
were illegal aliens from Mexico. The aliens were placed under arrest. A search
of the camper revealed twelve additional illegal aliens, whereupon Saldana,
" Terry's basic issue was viewed quite narrowly by the Court: "whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons
unless there is probable cause for an arrest." 392 U.S. at 15.
" See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
"E.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959). Both cases held that the detentions of the defendants and subsequent searches
of their automobiles were invalid under the fourth amendment. The Court found that the
"stops" were in reality arrests, and were invalid because probable cause was lacking.
40
Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 287, 300
(1971). See, e.g., Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970). In Gaines a policeman received an unconfirmed
tip that narcotics were being sold by the defendant. The policeman stopped the defendant
leaving his apartment, whereupon the frightened defendant attempted to throw a package
back inside the apartment. A search of the package revealed that it contained narcotics. The
Ninth Circuit, relying on Terry, held that a well-founded suspicion was all that was necessary
to detain the defendant for an unlimited inquiry. In Unverzagt the Eighth Circuit upheld
the "seizure" of the defendant by federal authorities in the men's room of a tavern. The
court stated that although no probable cause to arrest existed, under Terry the officers had
a limited right to stop a suspect for investigation.
41453 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1972); 1972 UTAH L. REv. 109; accord, United States v.
Granado, 453 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1972).
" It must be noted that border searches by their very nature comprise a necessary exception to fourth amendment search-and-seizure requirements. While probable cause to search
is not required, border searches are governed by the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement. See, e.g., Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945 (1967); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966); King v.
United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959). However, where a checkpoint for illegal aliens is manned a "reasonable distance" from a United
States border (usually interpreted as 100 miles), as in Saldana, the agent's conduct is no
longer governed by border search standards. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1970). The government in these instances must establish that the search was based on probable cause. See,
eog., Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Winer,
294 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
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an American citizen, was arrested and charged with knowingly transporting
aliens illegally in the United States. The trial court held that the stopping of
the vehicle itself constituted an arrest without probable cause, and the subsequent search was thereby illegal. The court of appeals reversed and relied on
Terry to justify the stop. The court found the initial stop not to be an arrest,
but a "reasonable and routine discharge" of the agents' duties. It must be noted,
however, that while the opinion in Terry referred to specific conduct arousing
suspicion of criminal activities in justifying the stop,' the initial inquiry in
Saldana was based upon no more than the presence of Mexican-Americans
travelling on the highways. It is questionable whether this observance alone
would lead one "reasonably to conclude . ..that criminal activity may be
afoot," as Terry required."
In conjunction with determining whether the investigatory stop in Saldana
was reasonable, it is interesting to compare Saldana with the Ninth Circuit
decision of United States v. Mallides.' There, two police officers patrolling in
an area of Oceanside, California, heavily populated by Mexican-Americans,
spotted a car occupied by six males appearing to be of Mexican-American
descent. As the car passed the patrol car, the officers noticed that the occupants
were sitting erect and that they did not turn to look at the patrol car as it passed.
The officers thereupon pursued and stopped the car, which the defendant
Mallides was driving. Upon investigation the officers discovered that Mallides'
passengers were illegal aliens. The Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction,
finding the initial stop to be illegal because it was based solely upon the officers'
unsupported intuition and not upon specific and articulable facts. "Tested by
any objective standard," the Court stated, "there is nothing suspicious about
six persons riding in a sedan. The conduct does not become suspicious simply
because the skins of the occupants are nonwhite or because they sit up straight
or because they do not look at a passing police car."
Saldana serves to illustrate a problem which originated with the opinion in
Terry: the Court failed to define precisely the proper standards for when a
"stop" for investigation is constitutionally permissible. Case authority is not
lacking which outlines the standards constituting the "probable cause" necessary
to justify a warrantless arrest; for example, a mere suspicion or belief has long
been held to be an inadequate ground."7 To achieve a similar standard, writers
have felt that the Court in Terry should have defined the "level of suspiciousness" that should exist in order for a police officer to stop and investigate a
suspect. "
392 U.S. at 27.
"Id. at 30. Terry noted the possibilities for "wholesale harassment" of minority groups
by "certain elements" of a police force through stop-and-frisk tactics, and warned that courts
would be ever vigilant against such harassing tactics. Id. at 14-15.
473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973).
4
1d. at 861.
47
E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Pace v. Beto, 469 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1972); Ortiz v. United States, 317 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir. 1963); United States v. Winer, 294 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Tex. 1969); Brown v. State,
481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gonzales v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 15, 95 S.W.2d
972 (1936).
41 Some writers have offered their own suggestions of what this precise criterion should
be. For instance, one author proposed that the proper standard be "a substantial possibility
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Saldana and Mallides further serve to illustrate the expansion of the Terry
decision's ruling. A narrow reading of Terry seems to reflect the Court's feelings
that the use of investigatory detention procedures in instances where probable
cause is lacking should be limited to on-the-street pedestrian-policeman confrontations. ' However, a study of case history since 1968 reveals that the
Terry rationale has been applied to investigatory detentions of occupants of
automobiles as well.5" While the Supreme Court has never directly ruled upon
whether Terry's holding regarding reasonable detentions is properly applicable
to stops of automobiles, it seems that the situations usually surrounding both
the pedestrian and the automobile occupant are analogous enough to merit
the same treatment." In Carpenterv. Sigler52 the Eighth Circuit strictly applied
Terry's dual reasonableness test," and upheld the actions of police officers in
stopping an automobile in a small Nebraska town late at night. The suspects
had been followed by the officers as they pursued an erratic course through the
town, passing slowly past certain business establishments in an area in which
many burglaries had recently occurred. The officers stopped the auto and asked
the suspects to get out of the car for identification purposes. While emerging
from the automobile, one of the suspects struck an object protruding from
beneath the front seat. The officer shined his flashlight onto the floor of the
car and spotted a crowbar and burglary tools. The auto was then fully searched
and the occupants were placed under arrest. The court found that the facts
and all reasonable inferences presented to the officers justified their initial
intrusion. The scope of the intrusion in forcing the occupants to get out of
the automobile was likewise found to have been reasonable because of the
darkness and the possibility that the occupants might have been concealing a
weapon out of sight."
Generally, the detention of a suspect has been upheld where objective facts
have existed to sustain the officer's conclusions that criminal activity may be
afoot." However, when the detention is based upon nothing more than an
that a crime has been or is about to be committed and that the suspect is a person who
committed or is planning the offense." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution.
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 75 (1968). See also Stern, supra
note 9, at 536.
"' "This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment
in the confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious circumstances." 392 U.S. at 4.
"See, e.g., Untermyer v. Hellbush, 472 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1973); Stone v. Patterson,
468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Parham, 458 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1972);
State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 504 P.2d 548 (1972); State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d
509 (Minn. 1973); State v. Nichols, 189 Neb. 664, 204 N.W.2d 376 (1973); State v.
Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tatro, 297 A.2d 139 (Pa.
Super. 1972); State v. Gluck, 7 Wash. App. 811, 502 P.2d 1222 (1972).
51 "Although a pedestrian and an automobile driver are not in identical circumstances,
we see no reason why similar Fourth Amendment standards should not be applied in both
situations. A person whose vehicle is stopped by police and whose freedom to drive away
is restrained is as effectively 'seized' as is the pedestrian who is detained." United States v.
Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973).
11419 F.2d 169 (8th Cit. 1969).
"3See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
4For cases with analogous fact situations, see Orricer v. Erickson, 471 F.2d 1204 (8th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Brumley, 466 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1972).
55See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1972) (stopping automobile carrying defendant wearing hat similar to that robber was wearing according to
description by victim); Stone v. Patterson, 468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972) (tip from in-
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inarticulate hunch or suspicion on the officer's part, the stop is unlawful according to Terry." In Commonwealth v. Pollard"' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a detention is unlawful if it is based upon nothing more than
the fact that the suspect is in a high crime area, and there is no further evidence
indicating that the suspect was committing any suspicious or unlawful act
prior to the stop.
The holding in Terry has been increasingly applied to situations in which
the policeman has received information from a source other than his own
observation regarding the alleged criminal activity on the detainee's part. "
Where the officer has received such information from a previously reliable
informant, 9 or from an anonymous telephone tip,* or has received a description of the robber from the victim of the robbery which vaguely fits the
appearance of the suspect,6 or has received a radio report vaguely describing
the getaway car in a rural bank robbery," courts have held that there is a
reasonable basis to stop the suspect and investigate. In People v. Harris3 police
received a phone call from an anonymous source which stated that the defendant had narcotics in his possession and gave a description of the defendant
and the location from which he would be leaving. Police who were dispatched
to the location observed two men, one matching the defendant's description,
enter a car parked nearby. Pulling alongside, the policemen announced that
they wanted to ask the suspects some questions. The defendant then threw a
foil package containing narcotics out of the car window, which the officers
seized. The court held that the policemen's actions were reasonable police
investigatory functions, noting that case law interpreting Terry "has further
articulated its application to investigatory detentions.""
However, reviewing courts should not wholly rely upon the policemen's
knowledge and analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the deten5
tion in determining its reasonableness. In State v. Nichols"
the Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld the stop of the defendant in circumstances disclosing
no reasonably suspected current criminal activity on the part of the defendant.
formant and subsequent corroboration of tip regarding defendant's activity by observing officers); United States v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1972) (car suspiciously parked
with two females in back seat in area of recent rape attempts); Wade v. United States, 457
F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1972) (black male detained at entrance of pedestrian tunnel by officers
responding to a dispatch that a black male had just attempted to molest children in the
same tunnel); United States v. Zubia-Sanchez, 448 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1971) (appellant's
automobile seen discharging passengers along highway immediately before reaching border
patrol checkpoint); United States v. Oswald, 441 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1971) (description
of automobile matching that where marijuana found in trunk).
96 392 U.S. at 22.
57450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973).
58See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), and notes 100-07 infra, and accompanying text.
.9 Stone v. Patterson, 468 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. James, 452
F.2d
1375 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60State v. Garcia, 83 N.M. 490, 493 P.2d 975 (App. Ct.), cert. denied, 83 N.M.
473, 493 P.2d 958 (1972).
"' United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362 (5th Cit. 1972).
62 United States v. Brumley, 466 F.2d 911 (10th Cit. 1972).
"2People v. Harris, 43 Mich. App. 531, 204 N.W.2d 549 (1972).
"43 Mich. App. 531, 537, 204 N.W.2d 549, 554 (1972). See also United States v.
James, 452 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Youngblood v. State, 47 Ala. App. 571, 258
So. 2d 913 (1972).
6189 Neb. 664, 204 N.W.2d 376 (1973).
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The arresting officers had received radio information from another officer that
the defendants were approaching their vicinity. The defendants had been
previously stopped by another officer who had obtained their names, descriptions, and auto registration and driver's license numbers. A subsequent radio
check disclosed that the defendants had burglary and drug arrest records. The
arresting officers, armed with only this information, then stopped the defendants although there had been no traffic violation or suspicious conduct
by the defendants prior to the stop. A radio was observed by one officer lying
on the floor of the car, and subsequent investigation revealed that the radio had
been stolen. The officers knew of no burglary which might have been committed in the vicinity, and one officer even testified that he had stopped the
defendants only because they were known burglars. The court upheld their
conviction, finding that the officers acted appropriately under the circumstances.
Results such as that in Nichols indicate that the reasonableness tests of Terry
must be strongly adhered to by courts, and not completely swallowed by lower
court dicta supporting "reasonable investigatory detentions" in all circumstances. Under the standards provided by the Court in Terry, such results as
Nichols clearly sanction denials of fourth amendment rights."
A recent area of controversy in conjunction with Terry and the investigatory
detention theory has been the police practice of checking drivers' licenses and
automobile registration papers in situations in which a stop under Terry may
be constitutionally impermissible. Many jurisdictions provide statutory authorization of such procedures,"7 and cases upholding the practice are multitudinous."
While such procedures are arguably beneficial in keeping unlicensed drivers
off the road, they are too often implemented to disguise police investigation
of other criminal activity. For instance, in Palmore v. United States? a District
of Columbia policeman observed a car with Virginia rental license plates and
stopped the car for a driver's license check, even though the defendant had
committed no traffic violation. The defendant's license was valid, but the car
rental agreement had expired. With the aid of his flashlight, the officer spotted
a pistol, which upon further investigation, proved to be unregistered. The
defendant claimed that the check was an unreasonable seizure under Terry
when he was stopped, due to the policeman's inability to point to any specific
facts of suspected criminal activity. The court upheld the policeman's actions
" "And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . .And simple '"good faith on the part of the arresting
officer is not enough." . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate .... .' 392 U.S. at 21-22, quoting Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). See also United States v. Wilson, 465 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.
1972).
"7 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 4 0-301(c) (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951, S 6-112
(1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-13-49 (1972); OHio REV. CODE ANN. S 4507.35
(1965); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 6687b, § 13 (1969).
" See, e.g., Gail v. Municipal Court, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1005, 60 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1967);
Garris v. United States, 295 A.2d 510 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Francis, 4 Ill.
App. 3d 65, 280 N.E.2d 49 (1972); Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512
(1963); People v. Russo, 38 Misc. 2d 957, 239 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1963); Cuyahoga Falls v.
Church, 10 Ohio App. 2d 9, 225 N.E.2d 274 (1967); State v. Campbell, 95 R.I. 370, 187
A.2d 543 (1963); Leonard & Turner v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
69290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
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in finding that the license check was not an unreasonable procedure. A definitive ruling in this area may soon be forthcoming, as Palmore is currently
pending in the United States Supreme Court with a determination of whether
probable jurisdiction exists being postponed until a hearing of the case on the
merits."0
In Texas, until recently, few decisions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had dealt with the validity of the "stop" stage of police investigative
procedures. While holdings of the court prior to 1972 had cited Terry in justifying policemen's actions in conducting on-the-street investigations, these cases
primarily were concerned with the validity of the arrests which followed the
initial confrontations."' More unusual is a holding in which Terry was cited to
justify the initial stages of an investigation of a parked automobile. In Onofre
v. State" the court held that a policeman's actions in approaching and shining
his flashlight into the defendant's auto parked behind a lounge after closing
time, and discovering marijuana on the seat, were constitutionally proper. The
defendant contended that because probable cause was lacking, the shining of
the flashlight into the automobile constituted an illegal search. The court agreed
that probable cause did not exist, but held that the policeman's methods and
the surrounding circumstances were appropriate for an investigation of suspected criminal activity under Terry. "As in Terry," the court said, "the officers
here were discharging a 'legitimate investigative function' when they approached the appellant's automobile.""'
B. The Frisk for Weapons
Besides granting the authority to "stop," Terry recognized that in appropriate circumstances, the policeman may conduct a pat-down of the suspect for
weapons. This authority to frisk does not arise automatically, concomitant to
the authority to stop.' Rather, a policeman may frisk only in circumstances
in which a "reasonably prudent man ...would be warranted in the belief

that his safety or that of others was in danger."'5 Further, the policeman "must
be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that
the individual was armed and dangerous."'" The Court has noted the potential
for abuse inherent in the authority to frisk," and Sibron and other decisions
have illustrated that this authority may not be improperly implemented to
disguise a warrantless search where probable cause is lacking."
70409 U.S. 1055 (1973).
'"Barrientes

v. State, 462 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Carter v. State, 445

S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Cox v. State, 442 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969).

S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
Id. at 701.
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United States v. Cunningham, 424 F.2d 942, 943 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
914 (1970).
nTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
76Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
77392 U.S. at 13-15; see note 44 sapra.
"aSee United States v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Collins, 439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. McIntyre, 304 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.
La. 1969); Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 352, 466 P.2d 704, 85 Cal. Rptr. 160
(1970); People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973); People
v. Navran, 483 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1971).
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A troublesome question has been: at what point will the apparent danger
presented to the investigating officer by the suspect be constitutionally sufficient
to warrant the initiation of a frisk?"9 While courts have placed great importance
on the appearance of circumstances as observed by the frisking officer, it is
clear that the frisk will not be upheld where it is unreasonable to believe
any potential danger is present." In United States v. Lopez8' a federal district
court noted the absence of adequate standards in this area and offered guidelines for determining whether this level of dangerousness exists. It stated that
the reviewing court must first determine the objective evidence available to the
policeman at the time of the frisk and the level of probability that the suspect
was armed and dangerous. The court must then determine whether these factors
justified the frisk in light of the manner and methods of the frisk and the
possible risk to the officer and the community if the individual is not disarmed
at once.
The "frisk" doctrine of Terry and Sibron has been going through a judicial
metamorphosis in recent years in regard to the specific thing or place to be
the subject of the protective search. A technical reading of Terry and Sibron
seems to authorize only limited frisks of the individual's person for weapons
in instances where probable cause to arrest or search is lacking." However,
since 1968, the decision's protective search for weapons rationale has been
applied to uphold searches involving more varied fact situations, including
searches of automobiles? 4 and even the contents of a glove compartment." In
6 the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of a search
United States v. Berryhill"
of a handbag belonging to the defendant's wife, who was riding in the automobile with the defendant at the time of his arrest. The court acknowledged
that no known authority existed that authorized an automatic personal search
of a companion of the arrestee present at the time and place of the arrest.
However, applying the frisk rationale of Terry, the court said, "We think
that Terry recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of such a
limited intrusion into a citizen's personal privacy extends to a criminal's companions at the time of arrest." 7
The sequence of procedures which Terry authorized has since been the subject of further refinement by courts. There is a heavy inference in Terry that
the authority to frisk can only arise following a reasonable investigation and
"See Cook, The Art of Frisking, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 789, 794-98 (1972).
80

E.g., in United States v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1972), it was held that
evidence obtained as the result of a frisk following the stop of the defendant for driving
with a noisy muffler was inadmissible since there was a complete absence of circumstances
revealing potential danger. Cf. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969).
8'328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
82
Id. at 1097.
83"We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
...
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him." 392 U.S. at 30.
"United States v. Preston, 468 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1972).
" State v. Zantua, 8 Wash. App. 47, 504 P.2d 313 (1972).
s8445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
8
'Id. at 1193. See also United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972), which
upheld the validity of a pat-down of a suspected armed companion of the arrestee.
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inquiry by the suspecting officer. However, in United States v. Pleasant" the
Eighth Circuit held that initial inquiries by investigating officers were not
necessary requirements which must be fulfilled before an officer can conduct
a protective search. There, officers acting on the basis of outside information
boarded a bus and arrested the defendant. The defendant thereupon reached
for a shotgun wrapped in a sweater in the baggage rack above. Police seized
the gun, and later at trial admitted the gun into evidence. The Eighth Circuit
determined that no probable cause existed to justify the defendant's initial
arrest. The defendant thereupon claimed that the subsequent seizure of the
shotgun was improper as a search incident to an unlawful arrest. The court
disagreed however with this contention, and held that the seizure of the gun
under the circumstances was permissible under Terry as a valid protective
search. While noting that a narrow reading of Terry lends itself to the interpretation that reasonable inquiries are necessary prior to such a search, the court
stated that, nevertheless, application of the Terry ruling depends upon the
peculiar facts presented in each case, and that in Pleasant the officer was acting
reasonably to protect his and others' safety in seizing the weapon from the
defendant. "
The chief area of misapplication of Terry's protective search doctrine in
Texas has been in the category of minor traffic violations. As pointed out
previously, technically Terry and Sibron pertain solely to frisks of the individual's person where probable cause to arrest is lacking. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, has cited the two decisions on occasion to justify
a wide-scale search of an automobile or its occupants incident to an "arrest"
for a traffic offense. Of course, questions have arisen before concerning the
constitutionality of searches of automobiles incident to arrests for minor traffic
violations.' For instance, it is highly speculative whether the issuance of
a traffic citation constitutes an "'arrest" of the type contemplated to initiate a
full-scale search for weapons and contraband. Likewise, the scope of such a
search remains undefined. While the Supreme Court has never directly considered whether an automobile or its occupant may be searched incident to a
traffic arrest where weapons or destructible evidence are not likely to be
present," Texas decisions have held that such searches are permissible. In Lane
v. State" a police officer stopped the defendant for speeding, ordered him to
step from his vehicle, and searched the automobile, discovering an illegal
weapon in the glove compartment. The court of criminal appeals held that
probable cause was not required to search the vehicle, because the search was
incidental to the arrest, and that no authority existed which limited the scope
of such a search. Other opinions by the court of criminal appeals have upheld
such unlimited searches where the defendant appeared nervous when stopped,"
88469 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 1124-25.
"See Comment, The Law of Arrest in Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REv. 303, 321 (1965).
"See Annot., 26 L. Ed. 2d 893 (1971). The Supreme Court will rule on the question
during its next term, however. State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972), cert. granted,
410 U.S. 982 (1973) (No. 71-1669); United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 982 (1973) (No. 72-936).
92424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968).
'" Pace v. State, 461 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
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or it appeared that the defendant was attempting "to hide something" in his
automobile. 4 The Fifth Circuit and courts in other jurisdictions have, however, invalidated similar exploratory searches incident to traffic arrests by
grounding their holdings on the principle that, absent special circumstances, a
vehicle search which is not related to the nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made is per se unconstitutional.'
The decisions in Terry and Sibron have thus become additional, valuable
weapons in the prosecution's arsenal in justifying full-scale searches incident
to traffic arrests. For instance, in Corbitt v. State' the defendant was stopped
and arrested for speeding, and the arresting officer observed he was intoxicated.
The officer then searched the automobile and discovered illegal drugs. The
court of criminal appeals upheld the search and additionally justified it on
"the need for the officer's protection," citing Terry." In Mitchell v. State"
the defendant was stopped for running a red light, and when the officer approached, he "leveled a barrage of abusive language" upon the officer. The
officer then searched the car and the defendant, finding marijuana in his pocket.
The court held that the search was valid because the officer had reason to
fear for his safety, citing Terry. Similar reference to Terry and Sibron appears
in other court of criminal appeals decisions regarding searches incident to
traffic arrests.' In light of these cases, it is submitted that searches of automobiles incident to arrests for traffic offenses lie outside the intended scope of
reasonable searches for weapons of Terry and Sibron, and their holdings
should not be applied to circumstances where probable cause to arrest or search
existed in the first place.
IV.

REDEFINITION AND SHIFT

Certain decisions handed down in 1972 and 1973 by the United States
Supreme Court and by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals represent further
refinement and utilization of the doctrine in Terry and are deserving of special
consideration and analysis.
Adams v. Williams.'"° A police officer patrolling in a high crime area of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, in the early morning was approached by an individual
who informed him that a person parked nearby in his automobile was carrying
narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the automobile in
"Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).

15Pace v. Beto, 469 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1972); Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391
F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967);
United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962); People v. McReynolds, 8 Cal. 3d
655, 504 P.2d 915, 105 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1973); People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807,
478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); People v. Ellis, 53 Ill.
2d 390, 292 N.E.2d 728
(1973); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); Thompson v. State,
487 P.2d 737 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
"1445 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
97
1d. at 186.
" 482 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
99Grego v. State, 456 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Oliver v. State, 455 S.W.2d
291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Sarabia v. State, 455 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 934 (1970).
'"407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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which Williams was sitting, tapped on the window, and asked Williams to
open his door. Williams instead rolled down the window, whereupon the
officer reached into the car and removed a pistol from Williams' waistband.
The officer arrested Williams and then searched the auto, discovering heroin.
The Second Circuit, granting Williams' petition for habeas corpus relief following his conviction, held that the officer's action constituted an invalid search
of his person and his auto.1"'
The Supreme Court determined in Adams v. Williams that the officer's
conduct did not constitute an unreasonable search, but rather was an appropriate protective response under the doctrine of Terry. The informant's tip
was found to have contained "enough indicia of reliability" to justify the stop,
although the Court noted that the same information would have failed the
reliable-credible test of Spinelli v. United States' and Aguilar v. Texas"' for
an arrest or search warrant.' In justifying the "frisk," the court found that
the officer's actions were reasonable for his self-protection in light of the
circumstances presented: the high crime rate in the area, the fact that Williams
was sitting in an automobile, and the fact that Williams rolled down the
window instead of opening the door as requested.' The seizure of the gun,
the Court said, gave the officer probable cause to arrest Williams for illegal
firearms possession.
At first glance the opinion seems to reflect a basic shift from Terry. In Terry
the policeman had acted on the basis of his personal observations, scrutinizing
the suspicious conduct before interference; Williams indicates that an officer
may stop and frisk solely on the basis of unreliable hearsay. The experience,
or trained eye, of the policeman in spotting potential criminal activity, so
relevant a factor in Terry, seems no longer important. In Williams the infor-.;
mation received by the officer failed to constitute probable cause to arrest the
defendant, but, as Terry held, probable cause is not required to detain a suspect
for investigation. Following the "stop," the question remaining was whether
the officer reasonably feared for his safety to justify the frisk. The Court,
however, failed to consider this important question. Sibron held that in order
for a policeman to initiate the frisk of a suspect, he must be able to point to
particular facts from which he can reasonably infer that the suspect is armed,
and that human safety is jeopardized."° Because a frisk constitutes a greater
invasion of personal privacy than a "stop," the Court should have more carefully scrutinized the question whether the policeman in Williams should have
101Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
102393

U.S. 410 (1969).

103378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Supreme Court in Aguilar and Spinelli held that a search
and seizure cannot be justified on the basis of conclusory allegations of an unnamed informant, unless the informant can be shown to have been reliable in his previous dealings
with the police and the information includes the underlying circumstances upon which the
informant based his conclusions regarding the defendant's alleged criminal activity. The
information received must meet this two-pronged test in order for there to be probable
cause to justify the issuance of a search or arrest warrant by a magistrate.
"0 407 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 147-48. It is interesting to note that one author foresaw the difficulties that
would be present in applying Terry to the case of a suspect seated in a vehicle. He implied
that more potential for danger exists in these circumstances than in those involved in a
pedestrian-to-pedestrian on-the-street detention as in Terry. LaFave, supra note 48, at 90.
10'See notes 74-76 supra, and accompanying text.
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relied more upon his personal observations and less on hearsay to initiate the
frisk." 7 As it stands, Williams implies that the authority to frisk may arise
automatically with the authority to stop, a result obviously not desired by the
Court in Terry."8
It is interesting to note that in Texas the officer's conduct in Williams could
be justified completely by statutory authority to arrest. Article 487 of the
Penal Code provides that a peace officer may arrest without warrant any
person unlawfully carrying firearms, and that the officer himself may be fined
$500 for refusing to arrest such violator "upon information from some reliable
person."" Moreover, article 14.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that where a peace officer is shown by satisfactory proof, "upon the representation of a credible person" that a felony has been committed and "there is no
time to procure a warrant," the officer may arrest the suspect without warrant.11
Questions of constitutional construction again arise. The provisions both authorize arrest in circumstances which Terry and Williams held would only be
appropriate for stop-and-frisk, because probable cause to arrest was lacking.
Brown v. State."' An officer on patrol in downtown Dallas about 1:30 a.m.
noticed an automobile with out-of-state license plates traveling ahead of him.
The officer had investigated a supermarket robbery the previous day, in which
the three robbery participants had been generally described. He pursued and
observed four men in the auto, three of whom he determined fitted the general
description of the robbery participants. He then observed the two men in the
back seat moving their shoulders, which he interpreted as signifying the concealment of firearms. The suspects stopped voluntarily, asking the officer the
reason for his pursuit. More patrolmen arrived and the suspects were searched.
A search of the automobile followed, revealing ammunition and a small
package of marijuana. A search of the trunk revealed weapons. The defendants
were charged and convicted solely of possession of marijuana. The court of
107"[A frisk] is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." 392
U.S. at 17. The Court in Williams initially rejected the defendant's contention that a stop
and frisk must be grounded solely upon the officer's personal observations. While the kinds
of on-the-street information an officer will receive will vary in value and reliability, the
Court found that in Williams the information was of the type to warrant an "appropriate
police response." 407 U.S. at 147.
108392 U.S. at 28-30; see United States v. Cunningham, 424 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914 (1970).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), has already been cited as controlling in many
subsequent decisions upholding police searches of suspects. In United States v. Pleasant, 469
F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1972), the court noted the expansion of Terry through Williams in
upholding the seizure of a weapon from a suspect where probable cause to arrest did not
exist. The defendant claimed that reasonable inquiries and investigation were required by
the police before the seizure under Terry. The court stated, "While a reading of Terry lends
itself to this interpretation, the later Supreme Court case of Adams v. Williams has, in our
view, expanded upon the language of Terry," and held that the seizure was, thus, proper
under Williams. 469 F.2d at 1124. See notes 88-89 supra, and accompanying text. See also
Untermyer v. Hellbush, 472 F.2d 156 (9th Cit. 1973); United States v. Ragsdale, 470
F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1972); State
v. Nichols, 189 Neb. 664, 204 N.W.2d 376 (1973).
'09TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 487 (1952); see Alexander v. State, 458 S.W.2d 656
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
"10 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN, art. 14.04 (1966).
1M481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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criminal appeals reversed, finding that there was no probable cause to arrest
or search, and that the circumstances were not proper for an investigative
stop under Terry.
The holding in Brown is significant for two reasons. First, the decision
illustrates the court of criminal appeals' increasing recognition of the doctrine
in Terry."' The second item of significance concerns the court's language. The
court stated that "three classes of probable cause" exist to justify a government
intrusion: "probable cause to arrest, probable cause to search and probable
cause to investigate.""' In determining the validity of the "stop" of the defendants, the court found that "this chain of inferences is too tenuous to establish
probable cause for an investigative stop.""' These statements can be interpreted
in two ways: (1) the court meant to use a more general term, such as "reasonable grounds," or "reasonable belief" instead of the judicially-defined "probble cause,""' or (2) the language is to be interpreted literally.
"Probable cause" implies a higher degree of incriminating circumstances
pointing to criminal activity than does "reasonable suspicion.""' Terry held
that probable cause need not exist to justify an investigative stop. Yet, if this
dicta in Brown is taken at face value, then probable cause must be present
to warrant a forcible detention in Texas. Also, the court's portrayal of probable
cause as divided into three "classes" is dangerous language. To proceed from
that premise and assert that less is required to find "probable cause to investigate" than to find "probable cause to arrest" would only further confuse an
already vague standard.
Talbert v. State."' A police officer on patrol at approximately 2:00 a.m. in
Austin spotted an automobile stopped alongside the curb of a street located
near the University of Texas campus. He observed a man enter the automobile
and then the automobile slowly drive away. The officer pursued the vehicle
for a distance and then stopped it to investigate further. No traffic violations
were observed, nor did it appear that the automobile's occupants were intoxicated or driving unsafely, but the officer later testified that the occupants
were driving in a "high crime area" and he was merely checking to see whether
everything was in order. The officer asked for identification from the occupants
and then radioed in for a warrant check. Upon returning to the stopped automobile, the officer spotted a brown paper sack on the seat. Closer inspection
revealed that the sack contained marijuana. The occupants were convicted
for unlawful possession of marijuana. The defendants contended that there
"12See also Hensley v. State, 494 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (Odom J.,
dissenting); Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Baker v. State, 478
S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Onofre v. State, 474 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972).
"'481 S.W.2d at 109-10.
114Id. at 112.
"' The court of criminal appeals elsewhere has said "probable cause" when they could
have arguably meant "reasonable grounds." E.g., in Lara v. State, 469 S.W.2d 177, 179
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972), the court held that the police
officers "had probable cause to be suspicious and the arrest was authorized under Art.
14.03 . . ." (Emphasis added.)
"' See note 2 supra.
17 489 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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was no justification for the stop of the automobile. The court of criminal appeals
agreed with the defendants and indicated their unwillingness to "blanket-label"
a substantial portion of a city as a high crime area to justify the stop of the
automobile in the circumstances presented. The court noted that the officer's
suspicion was the sole reason for his stopping the automobile, and that "the
inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith of an arresting officer is insufficient
'
to constitute probable cause for an arrest, search, or temporary detention."118
Further, the court held that the "facts presented simply do not furnish probable
cause to stop and arrest under Article 14.03 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] .... .""' A comparison was made with Brown v. State,

°

with the court

noting that Brown 'is factually much stronger than the instant case, yet was
reversed because of a lack of probable cause." To find an absence of probable
cause in Brown and then to determine that probable cause existed in Talbert
would be "wholly inconsistent" according to the court.
While as in Brown, the court in Talbert was technically guilty of misuse
of the term "probable cause," it is submitted that the result in Talbert is con-"
stitutionally correct and, further, evidences not only the court of criminal
appeals' increasing awareness of the doctrine of Terry, but also presumably its
increasing reluctance to rely solely upon outdated statutory authority such as
article 14.03 to justify constitutionally unwarranted government intrusions.
V.

CONCLUSION

In assessing the impact of Terry since 1968 it must be concluded that the
decision has in some instances expanded law enforcement in the area of governmental intrusions under the fourth amendment. A brief investigatory
detention of a suspect prior to Terry was arguably an arrest, thus requiring
probable cause to be valid; today, because of Terry, such a detention is subject
to a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny, and often receives only passing treatment by the reviewing courts. The frisk procedures authorized by Terry have
undergone judicial expansion as well. Today the doctrine of the protective
search of a suspect for weapons, applicable in Terry and Sibron to pat-downs
of the suspect's outer clothing, has been held applicable to searches of persons
and things well outside the scope of the suspect's personage, such as automobiles and companions of the suspect. While application of Terry's doctrine
should not be restrictively limited to on-the-street pedestrian-to-pedestrian encounters only, it is submitted that courts should place less emphasis upon
Terry in determining cases in which other decisions would be more analogously
applicable to the existing fact situation. For instance, if the fact situation of a
case deals with the search of an automobile following a minor traffic violation, certainly decisions regarding automobile searches 2' are logically more
11 d. at 311.
119 Id.

..See note 111 supra, and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973); Stoddard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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applicable and should be more controlling in determination than cases dealing
with the frisk of a suspicious pedestrian.
However, the need for police investigative procedures such as stop-and-frisk
cannot be denied if society is to have effective means of prevention, detection,
and apprehension of criminal activity. A most laudable aspect of Terry is the
decision's promotion of flexible, constitutional police responses to the variety
of situations that are presented to law enforcement officers; an inflexible
standard of probable cause demanding the same evidence no matter what kind
of police action is involved is neither warranted nor desirable in situations
which amount to lesser intrusions of the person or his property than an arrest
or a comprehensive search. This singular aspect of Terry perhaps explains its
frequent appearance as an authority in cases with fact situations dealing with
a wide spectrum of police conduct besides a technical stop-and-frisk. In Texas,
for instance, the decision has received increased recognition in recent court of
criminal appeals decisions. It is submitted that this development can be attributed to two probable factors: (1) the doctrine of Terry and stop-and-frisk
as a valuable tool for law enforcement is finding favor in the Texas courts,
and (2) the prosecution is becoming more reluctant to rely solely on statutory
authority to arrest, due to its often questionable constitutional validity.
To prevent further encroachment upon fourth amendment standards through
Terry, reviewing courts should not be discouraged from formulating more
refined and practical standards for a stop-and-frisk, as was attempted in United
States v. Lopez. 2' But it should foremost be remembered that the practices
authorized by Terry do not arise automatically without limitations, but are
subject to the reasonableness standard under the fourth amendment. If the
doctrine of stop-and-frisk which has evolved since 1968 is kept within these
confinements, the balance between the interests of crime prevention and the
individual's interests to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions may
be effectively struck. If, however, more substantial erosion of the doctrine is
permitted by non-vigilant courts, a "long step down the totalitarian path" will
be truly accomplished, as Justice Douglas warned the majority in 1968.'

122328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
123

392 U.S. at 38.

1971); see notes 81-82 supira, and accompanying text.

